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Abstract 
According to ethnolinguistic identity theory (ELIT), immigrants weigh the social value of their 
ethnolinguistic community, and make decisions as to whether or not they will attempt to improve 
their community’s value, depending on two factors: 1) if they have sufficient motivation to 
improve their status, and 2) if they have the agency to do so. Studying the variables that 
influence immigrants’ decisions to prefer their heritage languages over English, I investigate 
how immigrants construct their ethnic identities in ways consistent with ELIT. Much of the 
recent literature studying immigrant incorporation into the United States focuses on the ways in 
which immigrants weigh the economic costs and benefits of expressing certain ethnic markers. 
While useful, this segmented approach to assimilation overlooks the meaningful, non-economic 
aspects of identity formation that immigrants undergo. I conduct complex regression analyses 
using Wave 1 of the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS) – a set of data that has 
frequently been used to defend segmented assimilation theory – and find support for ELIT as a 
possible alternative in explaining the variation in heritage language preference within immigrant 
communities. 
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Beyond Segmented Assimilation: 
Signaling Ethnolinguistic Identity with Language Preference  
In recent decades, immigration has become increasingly politicized in the United States.  
Recent estimates predict that first and second generation immigrants will comprise 36% of the 
United States’ population by 2065 (Pew Research Center, 2015). Children of this large group of 
immigrants will attend schools, make language choices, and construct their ethnic identities 
amidst this politicization. As sociologists, we need to ensure that we take part in discourse about 
immigrant incorporation into society in a way that does not overlook the rich level of identity 
formation immigrants undergo. To help inform education scholars working to optimize dual-
language programs that work with children of immigrants, sociologists need to provide 
scholarship that addresses the ways in which children of immigrants develop their identities and 
perceptions of their languages status (Cervantes-Soon, 2014, p. 68). 
This study focuses on how immigrant youth growing up in turbulent political times make 
individual-level judgments about the value of their ethnic identities. I argue that ethnic identity, 
measured through non-English heritage language (HL) preference, is largely shaped by context 
of reception, including the presence of a co-ethnic community, discrimination, and parental 
economic capital. I examine how immigrants make judgments about dominant society, relative to 
their own ethnolinguistic community, which mediate the relationship between signaled identity 
and context of reception. To address these questions, I draw on Wave 1 of the 1991-2006 
Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS), including surveys given to 1.5 and second 
generation immigrants in the Miami/Ft. Lauderdale and San Diego areas. 
This study takes place within a sociological climate that puts significant focus on 
studying how some immigrants do or do not assimilate into American society (See: Portes and 
Rumbaut, 2001; Portes and Zhou, 1993; Waters, et al., 2010; Waters and Jiménez, 2005; 
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Zhou and Bankston, 1994). More recently, sociologists have shifted towards studying 
assimilation within a framework that allows for discussion about the immigrants who undergo 
segmented assimilation via selective acculturation. When undergoing these processes, 
immigrants pick components of their heritage culture to hold onto, based on the costs and 
benefits of expressing certain components of their identities (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Waters, 
et al., 2010). These assimilation theory models capture how immigrants interact with, take on, 
and are influenced by American norms; however, they frequently ignore how racialization and 
ascribed ethnolinguistic status are intertwined with the ways immigrants construct ethnic 
meaning (Bashi Treitler, 2015, p. 161).  
Alba (2002, p. 468) discusses the importance of studying language, calling it a “socially 
salient indicator of cultural differences and a marker of ethnic boundaries.” Language usage and 
aptitude has been at the center of many studies assessing how immigrants assimilate into society 
(Alba, et al., 2002; Alba and Nee, 2003; Portes and Schauffler, 1994; Waters, et al., 2010). While 
I agree that those who prefer English over their HLs are more assimilated into American society, 
I take the stance that analyzing language as merely a source of becoming less ‘foreign’ overlooks 
the complexity of how immigrants construct ethnic meaning. I argue that immigrants do not 
decide which language they prefer merely as a part of a macro-level assimilation trend; they 
make judgments about the value of the dominant society compared to their own. These 
judgments are constrained by the capital available to them and by their awareness of the 
differences in prestige assigned to their minority ethnolinguistic communities. 
Many scholars take a segmented assimilation approaching to studying immigrant 
incorporation, focusing on how immigrants construct their ethnic identities in response to the 
economic weighing of costs and benefits of signaling different economic markers. I approach 
immigrant incorporation from an ethnolinguistic identity theory (ELIT) perspective, focusing on 
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how immigrants construct their ethnic identities as a product of effortful attempts to preserve 
their ethnolinguistic communities’ status. ELIT claims that individuals aim to increase their self-
esteem by striving for positive social identities, so that they can view their social group as 
favorably distinct from others (Liebkind, 2010, p. 20). The theory explains that some immigrants 
signal their ethnic identity markers in response to perceiving their ethnolinguistic groups’ status 
as both a) illegitimate, and worth working to change and b) unstable, and capable of being 
changed. ELIT has not been studied in a way that follows immigrants on a large quantitative 
scale. I intend to contribute ELIT as an important theory to include in sociological discussions of 
immigrant incorporation. 
To defend ELIT as an approach in explaining variation in HL preference observed 
amongst the children of immigrant studied in the CILS database, I first confirm that a) heritage 
language preference varies significantly depending on national origin and national origin-
dependent context of reception variables. Next, I b) determine whether judging the U.S. and its 
values as ‘best’ increases immigrant children’s likelihood of signaling ethnic markers, such as 
HL preference. Finally, I c) study the interactions between the context of reception variables and 
judgments about dominant society that mirror the identity construction described in ELIT. I 
operationalize and test five hypotheses to test these three points. In the following section, I lay 
out the literature that led me to develop these hypotheses and defend the theoretical decision to 
study ELIT as it influences immigrant children’s construction of their ethnic identities in 
racialized American society. 
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Literature Review 
Assimilation theory & racialization 
 Assimilation theorists laid down the framework for discussing immigrant incorporation 
and the complex combination of factors that influence this process (Alba, et al., 2002; Alba and 
Nee, 2003; Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Portes and Schauffler, 1994; Portes and Zhou, 1993; 
Rumbaut, 1994; Waters, et al., 2010; Waters and Jiménez, 2005; Zhou and Bankston, 1994). I 
use this framework as a launch pad for my discussion of ELIT. 
Classic assimilation theory claims that incorporation into society is characterized by 
immigrants intermarrying with non-immigrants, increasing identification with the host, receiving 
less discrimination, and acquiring the host’s culture and language (Gordon, 1964; Brown and 
Bean, 2006). In other words, assimilating into dominant society involves moving towards 
convergence with the majority (Brown and Bean, 2006; Gans, 1979; Gans, 1992; Gordon, 1964). 
Other assimilation scholars expanded on classic assimilation theory, examining the ways in 
which immigrants lose their distinctiveness as they spend more time in the United States, and as 
heritage culture is passed (or not passed) from one generation to the next. These scholars focus 
more on how societal barriers keep immigrants from integrating into society, including factors 
such as their race and co-ethnic concentrations within communities (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; 
Portes and Zhou, 1993; Waters, et al., 2010; Waters and Jiménez, 2005; Zhou and Bankston, 
1994). Noticing changes in incorporation of Western Europeans, compared to that of newer 
migrants, Portes and Zhou (1993) concluded that differences in assimilation patterns could be 
explained by differences in immigrants’ reception into society. This line of thinking led to the 
development of segmented assimilation theory. 
Segmented assimilation theory was constructed to explain the ways in which some 
immigrants do not follow the typical straight-line assimilation path. Portes and Zhou (1993, p. 
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1172) claim that there are three paths an immigrant can take: 1) a path towards acculturation, 
followed by integration into the white middle class, 2) “permanent poverty and assimilation into 
the underclass,” and 3) rapid economic advancement, with selectively preserved or ‘segmented’ 
community values. Immigrants pick which path they will undergo depending on what level of 
ethnic maintenance they assume will lead to intergenerational mobility for their children 
(Waters, et al., 2010, p. 1172).  
Many segmented assimilation scholars assert that second generation immigrants hold 
onto their ethnic culture so they can receive support from their parents when faced with 
discrimination or when struggling to acquire host cultural knowledge (Mouw and Xie, 1999; 
Portes and Zhou, 1993; Waters, et al., 2010, p. 1172). Other scholars have pushed against this 
assertion, however, arguing that immigrants choose to preserve their ethnic characteristics not 
because they receive support from their parents, but because it helps them preserve ethnic ties 
within communities containing significant numbers of middle-class, educated co-ethnics 
(Waters, et al., 2010). Scholars in this latter category take a broader look at how ethnic 
embeddedness and social capital play a role in immigrants’ incorporation into society, but both 
groups of segmented assimilation theorists study how immigrants weigh the costs and benefits of 
maintaining components of their identities. My work comes close to these latter assertions of 
segmented assimilation theory, but focuses more on the ways in which immigrants express 
varying ethnic meaning in response to a context of reception-dependent non-economic factors. 
Ethnic identity construction via racialization. I examine HL preference, not as a 
function of assimilating or not assimilating, but as an ethnic marker signaled in ways that are 
constrained by various forms of racialization. Racialization can sway some immigrants to lean 
more towards expressing markers that are either more prototypically “American” or more 
towards expressing those that prototypically “foreign” (Kibria, 2000, p. 87). Alba and Nee (2003, 
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p. 41) explain that assimilation results from attempts to pursue success and ‘American’ status. 
They claim that the pursuit of “familiar goals – a good education, a good job, a nice place to live, 
interesting friends and acquaintances, economic security” frequently results in assimilation (Alba 
and Nee, 2003, p. 41). Alternatively, ethnographic work reveals that ‘becoming American’ is not 
just a product of trying to achieve American success, but it is a product of race, given that 
racialization directly impacts how immigrants make sense of who they are amongst conflicting 
pressures to promote multiple identities (Bloemraad, 2013; Kibria, 2000).  
Scholars who study racialization’s impact on immigrant identity construction echo Du 
Bois’s concept of double consciousness in The Souls of Black Folk (1903). Second and 1.5 
generation immigrants not only deal with the challenges of negotiating two identities, but are 
also, in a way, expected to not be fully American if they express heritage markers the host 
society members expect them to express. Immigrants undergo civic ostracism, a process in which 
whites frame immigrants as inassimilable with whites due to so-called ‘cultural’ factors (Kim, 
1999). As a result, many people treat Korean Americans and Chinese Americans as the same, 
given their belonging to the ‘Asian race’ (Kibria, 2000, p. 92). At the same time, when reporting 
on what it means to ‘be American,’ non-white immigrants discuss the importance of having an 
“American look” and adopting American practices such as speaking English (Bloemraad, 2013, 
p. 56). Immigrants interact within a system in which ‘being American’ is viewed as mutually 
exclusive of being ‘foreign.’ 
This concept of Du Bois’s twoness is especially visible historically as it applies to 
discourse about bilingualism. In 1915, Theodore Roosevelt stated, “We have room for but one 
language [in America], and that is the English language, for we intend to see that the crucible 
turns our people out as Americans, of American nationality, and not as dwellers in a polyglot 
boarding house” (Garcia, 2014, p. 64). Expressing similar discourse in 2003, a Vanity Fair 
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advice column author wrote, “Forget Spanish... As for everyone's speaking it, what twaddle! 
Who speaks it that you are really desperate to talk to? The help? Your leaf blower?” (Garcia, 
2006).  
Racialization of ethnic factors, such as language, constrains immigrants’ ethnic agency 
by leading them to change how they emphasize various parts of their identity in order to 
minimize the costs of performing ethnicity in other ways. For example, a Korean American 
discussed in Kibria’s (2000, p. 91) study reported that he chose to invest more time learning his 
heritage language when he was discriminatorily placed in a role at his work place where he was 
expected to be an ‘authentic Korean’ who expressed fewer prototypical American markers. A 
Chinese American parent reported wanting to raise his children valuing Chinese culture because, 
“It’s really important to value your background and culture, not just because it’s important to 
you, but because it’s important to everyone around you” (Kibria, 2000, p. 92). On the flip-side a 
19-year-old Ecuadorian woman explained, “'It’s an advantage to have my American and my 
Ecuadorian cultures. But, when I go to Ecuador, I don’t feel like I belong there because they say, 
‘You are not really Ecuadorian, you’re American.’ And when I’m here, I’m not fully American.” 
These examples depict the struggles immigrants undergo in making decisions to be either 
‘foreign’ or American. In their eyes, they may want to be both, but in others’ eyes, they cannot 
be both. 
Taking racialization into account is especially important when studying immigrant 
children. Second and 1.5 generation immigrants are in a particularly challenging place, bridging 
their parents’ heritage background to the American culture within which they grew up. Speaking 
their heritage language gives children of immigrants the opportunity to link to themselves 
symbolically to their ethnolinguistic communities (Nesteruk, et al., 2015, p. 469). Immigrant 
children in English monolingual schools are exposed to the “American” marker of speaking 
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English, early and consistently as they grow up (Fillmore 1991, p. 342). Fillmore (1991, p. 342) 
writes, “Language-minority children... have only to turn on the television and they can see that 
they are different in language, in appearance, and in behavior, and they come to regard these 
differences as undesirable.” Language is one of the significant ways in which immigrant children 
experience ‘American’ vs. ‘foreign’ racialization, given that it is such a salient feature of 
Americanness. 
Heritage language and context of reception 
Language preference is a purposeful way of constructing ethnic meaning. Immigrants 
who choose to avoid this shift from HL preference to English preference do so because they have 
both the motivation and the agency to do so. Such agency and motivation is influenced by a 
number of community of practice factors for which I will provide a background. 
Heritage language’s treatment as an ethnic marker. Heritage language ability has 
strong ties to ethnic identity. Latin American descendants are four times more likely to identify 
as non-Hispanic if they only speak English, compared to those who speak some Spanish (Emeka 
and Vallejo 2011, p. 1558). As an ethnic marker, language can also be racialized to be 
‘American’ or ‘foreign.’ Tokao Ozawa, a Japanese emigrant attempting to convince the United 
States Justice System that he deserved naturalization in 1914, wrote, “I am not an American, but 
at heart I am a true American,” and listed his qualities, which he felt proved his true 
Americanness. Alongside factors associated with classical assimilation, such as going to 
American schools and churches and marrying a white American woman, Ozawa listed speaking 
only American English in his home so that his children could not learn Japanese (Haney López, 
1996, p. 80).  
In addition to immigrants expressing a strong link between Americanness with speaking 
English, assimilation theorists also have tended to study heritage language ability or usage as a 
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measure of assimilation into America (Waters, et al. 2010). Many assimilation scholars agree 
that language is a means of ethnic signaling, describing language as a “socially salient indicator 
of cultural difference and a marker of ethnic boundaries” (Alba, 2002, p. 468; Alba and Nee, 
2003). I regard the strong association between language preference and assimilation as 
significant evidence that language can be studied as a symbolic category tightly linked to 
ethnicity and Americanness. 
Context of reception. Context of reception can be approached from many different 
perspectives. Portes and Rumbaut (2001) are credited with establishing the term context of 
reception to describe how immigrants interact within typical modes of incorporation into 
dominant society. Jones (2012) breaks context of reception into three factors: 1) racial meanings 
brought by immigrants and established as norms within the host community, 2) demographic 
factors related to economic growth, and 3) institutions and the support that they provide (or fail 
to provide). The timing in which these immigrants arrive likely influenced the effects of Jones’s 
(2012) three context of reception categories. It is also reasonable to assume that had immigrants 
come from different nations, or had immigrated at a different time, they would have faced 
radically different contexts of receptions, given that they likely would have interacted differently 
with economic systems, national and local policies, and racial norms (Portes and Schauffler, 
1994; Foner and Kasinitz, 2007). 
Sociolinguists understand context of reception variables as influencing minority 
languages speakers’ HL preference via a community’s ethnolinguistic vitality (EV), which I will 
explain in more detail in the next section (Crystal, 2002). Crystal (2002) states that having 
prestige and legitimate power – characterized by having a “strong presence in the educational 
system,” the ability to write in their language, and the ability to access language in their 
community – increases the likelihood that an ethnolinguistic community will prioritize their 
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heritage language. While I agree that these variables influence heritage language preference, I 
hypothesize this happens indirectly, by influencing minority languages speakers’ views of their 
languages’ ethnolinguistic vitality (EV), but I will discuss this mediating effect later. 
Considering how HL preference is an ethnic marker constrained by context of reception 
variables, I generated the following two hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1. Second generation immigrant heritage language preference varies 
depending on parental national origin. 
Hypothesis 2. The relationship between second-generation immigrant heritage language 
preference and parental national origin is mediated by context of reception. The context of 
reception variables I focus on are those tied up with ELIT. In following sections, I explain these 
specific factors in more detail.  
Constrained ethnic identity construction: Ethnic agency, EV, & SIT 
Though context of reception is important in influencing identity expression, it does not 
directly determine language choices. Its effect is mediated in part by individuals’ judgments 
about their community’s prestige and ethnolinguistic vitality (EV) (Crystal, 2002). In this 
section, I explain how context of reception factors can constrain an individual’s ethnic agency, 
impact their likelihood of judging their community’s EV as illegitimate and unstable, and lead 
them to prioritize expressing markers. 
Immigrants belonging to dominated racial groups have considerably less ethnic agency 
than those who belong to more powerful groups (Desmond and Emirbrayer 2009). For example, 
some non-white, dominated immigrants may recognize a need to emphasize their distinctive 
ethnic markers or to cleanse themselves from them all attempts to pass into dominant society. 
Others may not have enough agency to make these choices (Desmond and Emirbrayer 2009, p. 
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23). Either way, some ethnic choices cannot take place unless immigrants both recognize that 
they are dominated and have the agency to push against their domination. 
Social psychologists explain this interaction more thoroughly. According to social 
identity theory (SIT), individuals aim to increase their self-esteem by striving for positive social 
identities so as to view their own group as favorably distinct from other groups (Liebkind, 2010, 
p. 20). Giles and Johnson (1987) formally extended SIT into the ethnolinguistic realm, 
establishing ethnolinguistic identity theory (ELIT), which posits that ethnic groups may adjust 
the performance of their identity depending on how they associate status with particular identity 
markers. According to ELIT, when individuals favor their language, they may take on features 
that make their group “favorably distinct” from others’, but if they are ashamed of their 
language, they may attempt to assimilate or “pass” into dominant society (Giles and Johnson, 
1987; Liebkind, 2010). This process can explain language choices, but becomes more 
complicated upon considering the ways in which EV can manifest. 
EV judgments. EV refers to the ability of an ethnolinguistic group to survive as a 
distinctive entity in the presence of other ethnolinguistic groups (Giles et al., 1977; Liebkind, 
2010). High in-group status, high demographic strength, and high levels of institutional 
representation signal high EV. According to ELIT, high EV is usually associated with high in-
group identity, but under some circumstances, it may be associated with low in-group identity 
(Giles et al., 1977; Liebkind, 2010).  
Allard and Landry (1994) proposed a subjective vitality analysis model that addresses the 
conditional divergence from the positive association between EV and in-group ID (Liebkind 
2010). Allard and Landry (1994) found that subjects’ evaluation of their ethnolinguistic 
community’s EV as either legitimate or illegitimate predicted respondent language choices. They 
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performance, but the subjective judgments about the EV, such as whether the EV is stable and 
thus a “lost cause,” or is unstable and is worth attempting to change (Allard and Landry, 1994; 
Liebkind, 2010). For many immigrants, the decision to reinforce ethnic markers depends on them 
1) perceiving there being something that needs to be done to improve their group’s EV, and 2) 
seeing their group’s EV as unstable and thus changeable (Liebkind 2010). I will explain these 
two conditions, as they relate to specific context of reception factors, in more detail in the next 
two sections. Allard and Landry’s work with ELIT captures how immigrants do not just 
assimilate in response to economic motives, but also make specific judgments about their in-
group’s ascribed EV in comparison to their in-group’s ideal EV. According to ELIT, judgments 
about one’s EV directly influence language preference (Allard and Landry, 1994; Liebkind, 
2010). This led me to develop Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 3. When second generation immigrants judge their ethnolinguistic group’s 
low EV as illegitimate, they have an increased likelihood of preferring their heritage language to 
English. 
Constrained ethnic agency. Liebkind (2010) claims that, according to ELIT, there are 
two conditions that must be met for immigrants to work to push against their low EV and attempt 
to raise their in-group status via signaling their ethnic markers. First, immigrants must see their 
status as unstable and changeable, and second, they must have significant motivation to resist 
against the low EV dominant society ascribes to them. I will focus on the former condition first. 
Immigrants are unlikely to make such positive judgments about their community’s EV, and are 
thus unlikely to signal their ethnic markers, if they feel they are unable to improve their EV 
(Liebkind, 2010, p. 24). In other words, immigrants must have enough capital and agency in 
order to resist against their low status. Context of reception factors that regulate this agency 
include social capital and and parental economic capital. 
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Haugen (1987) explains that migration frequently is a ‘network’ decision, in which 
immigrants rely on economic and social support from friends and family who come from similar 
sending locations. Rather than having to immediately use English most of the time, or to find 
jobs without any resources other than their own, they share capital (Haugen, 1987; Massey, et al., 
1994). According to segmented assimilation theory, living with co-ethnics constrains 
immigrants’ ethnic agency, given that immigrants are pushed to live with other immigrants and 
share their capital in order to minimize the costs of immigrating. Living in areas and attending 
schools with higher co-ethnic concentrations increases immigrant heritage language preference 
and usage (Tubergen and Mentjox, 2014; Emeka and Vallejo, 2011). This could happen in part 
because immigrants feel a need to share identities with those they interact with. For example, 
some immigrants report feeling like they should be more expressive of ethnic markers when they 
have received criticisms from co-ethnics as “acting white” or for no longer valuing their ethnic 
identity (Nesteruk, et al., 2015).  
Even though this relationship between living with co-ethnics and HL preference could be 
explained by segmented assimilation theory, it could also be explained by ELIT. Living with co-
ethnics can do more than just constrain immigrants’ choices to prioritize expressing their ethnic 
identity; it can provide immigrants with a group within which they can construct valued in-group 
ethnic identities. Living with co-ethnics can also increase individuals’ likelihood of having 
people around with whom they can speak their heritage language (Stevens, 1992, p. 181). If 
immigrants do not have other co-ethnics with whom they can speak their language and unite, 
then according to ELIT, motivation to resist against their low EV may be insignificant. 
Social capital is one factor that I hypothesize positively regulates immigrants’ likelihood 
of viewing their low EV as unstable and changeable. Parental economic capital is another 
component that acts in such a way. Crystal (2002) argues that having a significantly high enough 
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amount of wealth in the community decreases the association between ethnolinguistic markers 
and a lack of upward mobility. This led me to develop Hypothesis 4. 
Hypothesis 4. Having co-ethnic friends and having a sufficiently high economic status 
can lead to heightened perceptions that a community possesses capital and a high enough EV 
enable immigrants to respond by signaling their ethnic identity. If immigrants perceive that they 
have enough capital to increase their EV, then they have the functional ability to try to positively 
change their EV by signaling ethnic markers via HL preference.  
Decision making within ethnic agency. Having a high enough EV increases 
immigrants’ agency to value their ethnic markers as higher than dominant American English 
markers, but according to ELIT, this is not the only factor that determines whether immigrants 
will make these judgments. Immigrants must also have the motivation to work to improve their 
community’s EV. I assume that having enough motivation to make a change is influenced by a) 
experiencing discrimination and b) having a significantly low socioeconomic status to decide 
that it is worth it to push against dominant society. Both of these factors increase the saliency of 
immigrants’ ethnic identity and signal that they have a low ascribed EV in their community, 
without which, they would have no reason to resist against dominant society’s ethnic markers 
(Liebkind, 2010).  
In his early studies of 1.5 and second generation immigrants from Miami and San Diego, 
Rumbaut (1994, p. 20) found that those who experience discrimination and who believe that they 
will be discriminated against, no matter how much education they acquire, are less likely to 
identify as American and to instead show more loyalty towards their national-origin. One 
second-generation Chinese American man gave the following report in Kibria’s (2000, p. 87) 
study: 
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“I’m not usually very conscious of being Chinese. When I’m conscious it’s because I’ve 
been reminded of it. But like the other day I was in a gas station and this lady was 
looking for directions. She came up to me and said, 'Do you speak English?' I was really 
kind of surprised, taken aback, it actually took me a minute to figure out what she was 
talking about. And I felt like, what the hell is she talking about? I can barely say a few 
words of Chinese.”  
Increased awareness of one’s ethnic identity can make immigrants more likely to assert their 
identity. This was especially the case during the ethnic revitalization movements that took place 
in 1960s (Nagel, 1995; Phinney, 1990, p. 499). Liebkind (2010, p. 23-24) argues, “particularly 
for ethnic minority groups, identification can provide a buffer against possible aversive effects of 
group membership, such as perceived discrimination.”  
Following the logic of ELIT, choices are constrained for individual immigrants. They 
realize that in order to have more capital, as well as a sense of belonging to a valued community, 
both of which they get from being a part of a co-ethnic community, they must defend their in-
group identity and aim to increase their community’s EV. They will have little motivation to 
prioritize boosting their community’s EV, even if they have the agency to do so, unless they 
believe that their community is in a position worth defending. 
Discrimination does not influence the part of EV related to ethnic agency. Rather, 
discrimination decreases a community’s ascribed EV. I argue that having individual capital can 
also evoke ethnic responses that are non-economic in their effects. Having low socioeconomic 
status, like being discriminated against, can evoke the perception of a community having an 
illegitimately ascribed low EV. Portes and Schauffler (1994, p. 644) argue that higher parental 
socioeconomic status leads immigrants to have lower rates of bilingualism, because having more 
capital provides children with more access to the cultural mainstream. This effect could also be 
 
 18 
 
explained by ELIT, however. While immigrants need a certain level of economic capital to have 
significant ethnic agency, as previously discussed, if they have too much capital, then the effect 
of ethnic agency might not be significant at all because they might not recognize their low social 
status and how it might possibly be tied to their race or ethnicity (Allard and Landry, 1994; 
Liebkind, 2010). Those in dominant and privileged groups have agency to not think about their 
ethnic identity as a significant part of their identity; meanwhile, those in dominated groups do 
not have the agency to not think about their ethnicity (Desmond and Emirbrayer 2009, p. 23). 
According to ELIT, when immigrants do not perceive themselves as having low EVs, 
likely because they neither have low socioeconomic status nor receive discrimination, they do 
not judge their EV as illegitimate. Instead of responding by valuing the expression of their own 
ethnic markers over those of dominant American English society, these immigrants thus have no 
extra motivation to increase their ethnolinguistic community’s EV. This complex interaction 
between parental socioeconomic status, perceived discrimination, ethnic agency variables, and 
judgment variables led me to generate Hypothesis 5.  
Hypothesis 5. Having parents with high job prestige (an operationalization for economic 
capital) and not being personally discriminated against – both of which are a part of a positive 
context of reception – negatively moderate the effect of ethnic agency on the chance immigrants 
will judge their statuses as illegitimate, and therefore respond by expressing preference for their 
HL. 
  
 
 19 
 
Methods 
To make the case for ethnolinguistic identity theory (ELIT) as a possible means of 
studying variation in HL preference amongst U.S. immigrants, I run the following described 
analyses with the immigrants surveyed in Wave 1 of the CILS database. This study is completely 
quantitative in its methodology. I assess individuals’ responses to questions about HL preference, 
context of reception factors, and judgments about America’s greatness. I conduct regression 
analyses to test certain components of ELIT, and examine how effect sizes of certain variables 
change upon controlling for the effects of variables I hypothesize to be related to them. 
Data. I analyzed data from the first wave of the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal 
Study (CILS), a panel study that began in 1991 with over 5000 eighth and ninth grade immigrant 
children in the metropolitan areas of Miami/Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, and San Diego, California 
(Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). All students surveyed were either 1.5-generation immigrants born 
outside of the United States, who immigrated prior to entering adolescence, or second-generation 
immigrants born in the United States. I analyzed Wave 1 to focus specifically on immigrant 
incorporation and identity formation amongst immigrant youth. Most of the children surveyed 
were eighth and ninth grade students when the survey was conducted. 
My sample only included participants who reported having both parents born in the same 
countries. Doing this allowed me to focus on children of immigrants who experience the 
nationality-specific context of reception effects of only one national origin, rather than two (such 
as children of immigrants who are fully Cuban or fully Vietnamese). I further narrowed my 
dataset to only include respondents with national origins with at least 100 other respondents 
surveyed and with specifically coded responses to the database variable from which I constructed 
the “has co-ethnic friends” independent variable (only removing Jamaica from the national 
origins sampled). This brought the sample size to 3205, including immigrants with national 
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origins of Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, Haiti, Laos, Nicaragua, the Philippines, and Vietnam. I used 
multiple imputation with my data to avoid biasing it by non-response values. 
Variables. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study, 
before running multiple imputation. Here are descriptions of the variables discussed. 
HL Preference. Heritage language preference is the dependent variable. Respondents 
open-endedly reported the language they preferred to speak most of the time. I coded those who 
responded with English a 0 and those who responded with a non-English language a 1. 31.3% of 
the studied participants reported they preferred speaking a non-English language most of the 
time, which I assumed to be their heritage language (HL). Unlike HL ability, HL preference 
implies a level of value of one language over another. One can have aptitude in a non-English 
language and still not see value in it. Many studies (Alba, 2002; Alba and Nee, 2003; Portes and 
Schauffler, 1994; Waters, et al., 2010) examine factors that affect language usage, but in doing 
so, look only at the ways in which immigrants possess language ability that is available to them 
growing up. Language preference exists on a plane that is about more than just what is available 
to them; language preference involves the framing of their in-group identities in a way that is 
expressed functionally and saliently in relation to dominant society.  
Unlike many scholars (Shin, 2011; Stevens, 1992) who study language use in the home 
domain, I study ‘most of the time’ language preference so that I can understand general attitudes 
towards this ethnic marker (Fishman, 1972). I operationalize my heritage language variable by 
assuming that in answering the question, “What language do you prefer to speak most of the 
time,” they are not just thinking about what they speak at home or what will help them to get a 
job someday; they are eighth and ninth graders considering what language they prefer to speak 
with their friends at school, sometimes in the face of discrimination, having co-ethnic friends, 
and low socioeconomic prestige. By including the frequency in which a non-English language is 
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used at home as a control variable, I examine how immigrants make language preference 
decisions in response to individual judgments, rather than merely in response to the languages 
available to them. 
Context of Reception Variables. I selected three context of reception variables to focus 
on: combined parent socioeconomic index (SEI), having co-ethnic friends, and reported 
discrimination. These three variables were selected because of their previously described 
involvement with ELIT. Combined parent SEI was selected by taking the sum of mother SEI 
scores and father SEI scores, both of which measured parental occupational prestige. This 
variable serves as proxy for parental economic capital. I selected it because, unlike household 
income, it captures the overall prestige of someone’s job, rather than just what is available to 
them. I constructed having co-ethnic friends as a variable by determining the national origin of 
the respondents, and then determining if they had close friends who were born in the same 
country as the respondents’ parents. Reported discrimination was constructed as a response to the 
question, “Have you ever felt discriminated against?” 
Judgments about America’s greatness. To operationalize judgments about immigrants’ 
ideal EV, in comparison to that of dominant society, I study agreement with the statements, “The 
American way of life weakens the family” and “There is no better country to live in than the 
U.S.” Both of these responses are judgments about the value of dominant society culture as 
compared to their own ethnolinguistic culture. I assume that individuals who judge America and 
its values negatively are more likely to judge their own ideal EV as significantly high, at least in 
comparison to American English’s EV. Furthermore, I assume that immigrants’ disagreement 
with “There is no better country to live in than the U.S.” and agreement with “The American 
way of life weakens the family” aligns with the assessments of their in-group identity as 
subjectively high and worth being valued in comparison to that of dominant society. According 
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to ELIT, high expression of these judgments can increase motivation to express distinctive ethnic 
markers. Therefore, I expect to observe that immigrants expressing these resistant attitudes will 
more likely prefer speaking their heritage language (Liebkind, 2010). 
 Data Analysis Procedure. Using these operationalized variables to fit the different 
theorized components of ELIT, I test the previously described hypotheses to determine if I can 
find support for the theory amongst significantly large immigrants groups in the Miami/Ft. 
Lauderdale and San Diego areas.  
Understanding the Presented Regression Tables. I test most of my hypotheses by 
comparing effect sizes between different regression models. I examine how variables’ 
associations with HL preference strengthen or dampen upon controlling for the effects of the 
variables I hypothesize affect them. Tables 3, 4, 5, 7, and 9 take this approach to address 
different hypotheses. Each of these five tables presents a base logit model including national 
origin and control variables as independent variables (with Tables 5, 7, and 9 also including the 
agreement with America’s greatness variable and two context of reception variables, and Table 4 
including interactions effects between national origin and context of reception variables) and 
then progressively adds in variables. In each of the tables, I have bolded the variables I expected 
to change (or not change) according to my hypotheses. Note that when looking at Tables 3, 4, 5, 
7, and 9, I am more interested in how effect sizes strengthen or dampen, rather than just in the 
effect size values themselves. 
Tables 6 and 8 begin with a base model, including the effects of national origin, two 
context of reception variables, the variable for agreement with America’s greatness, and the 
controls. The second and third models in these tables present the effects of the variables in the 
base model when the data is stratified by the context of reception variable in discussion. 
Presenting it in this way allows us to examine how the effect sizes on context of reception and 
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agreement with America’s greatness on HL preference depend on the variable by which the data 
is stratified. 
 Control Variables. Throughout my regression analyses, I control for parental arrival 
years, sex, age, time living in the U.S., having citizen status, being a 1.5 generation immigrant 
rather than a second generation immigrant, parental English knowledge, and the frequency in 
which non-English languages are used at home. To simplify my presentation of results, I hide the 
effects of these control variables in Tables 3 through 9. Tables including the effect sizes of these 
control variables are available by request. 
Hypothesis Testing. Before presenting my results, I will explain how I specifically test 
each hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1. I hypothesize that second generation immigrant HL preference varies 
significantly depending on parental national origin. To test this, I examine a cross tabulation of 
national origin and HL preference (presented in Table 2). I also conduct a chi-squared test to test 
the null hypothesis that the variance in HL preference does not depend on national origin. 
Hypothesis 2. In hypothesis 2, I predict that the relationship between second-generation 
immigrant heritage language preference and parental national origin will be mediated by the 
context of reception variables I focus on in this study. To test this, I conduct chi-squared 
analyses, testing the null-hypotheses that HL preference does not vary depending on having co-
ethnic friends and that it also does not vary depending on reporting being discriminated against. I 
also conduct a two-sample t-test testing the null-hypothesis that combined parent SEI values are 
not significantly different amongst immigrants who preferred English versus preferred their HL. 
I examine a cross tabulation (in Table 2) between these context of reception variables and HL 
preference to infer the directional associations between these variables. I examine Table 3, as 
previously described, to examine how the effect sizes of national origins change upon adding in 
 
 24 
 
the model context of reception variables and the interaction between context of reception 
variables and national origin. Assuming that context of reception variables partially moderate the 
effect of national origin on HL preference, as I progressively add context of reception variables 
into the models, I expect to observe changes in the significance levels of the effect sizes of 
national origins on HL preference. 
Hypothesis 3. When second generation immigrants judge their ethnolinguistic group’s 
low EV as illegitimate – operationalized as disagreeing with the statement, “There is no better 
country to live in than the U.S.” and agreeing with the statement, “The American way of life 
weakens the family” – I hypothesize that they have an increased likelihood of preferring their HL 
over English. To test this, I conduct chi-squared analyses, testing the null-hypotheses that HL 
preference does not vary depending on agreement with these judgment factors. To infer the 
directional associations between these variables, I examine a cross tabulation (in Table 2) 
between these context of reception variables and HL preference. I examine Table 4, as 
previously described, to determine whether there is a significant association between agreement 
with these judgments and HL preference, even after controlling for the effects of national origin, 
context of reception, the interaction between national origin and context of reception, and the 
controls. I predict that strongly agreeing with (compared to strongly disagreeing with) the 
statement that the American way of life weakens family ties will have a significant positive 
effect on HL preference. I also predict that strongly agreeing with (compared to strongly 
disagreeing with) the statement that there is no better place to live than the United States will 
have a significant negative effect on HL preference. 
Hypothesis 4. I hypothesize that having co-ethnic friends and having a high economic 
status can lead to heightened perceptions that a community possesses capital and a high enough 
EV to enable immigrants to respond by signaling their ethnic identity. If immigrants perceive 
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that they have enough capital to increase their EV, then they are more likely to feel that they can 
positively change their EV by signaling ethnic markers via HL preference, and are thus more 
likely to rate the value of their ethnolinguistic community as higher than that of dominant 
society. I operationalize this hypothesis in three ways: a) SEI will have a significant negative 
association with the judgment that America is great; b) having co-ethnic friends will have a 
significant negative association with the judgment that America is great; and c) SEI and having 
co-ethnic friends will significantly interact in influencing HL preference.  
To address parts a and c of Hypothesis 4, I run an analysis of variance test examining the 
effect of parental SEI on the judgment that America is great and on having co-ethnic friends. I 
examine Models 3 and 4 of Table 5, which build off of the base model by adding in the 
SEI*having co-ethnic friends interaction and the SEI*”U.S. is the best” interaction. Further 
testing parts a and c, I expect to find that adding in these interactions will dampen the effect sizes 
of having co-ethnic friends and agreement with America’s greatness. 
To address part b and to further examine part c, I examine the differences in effects sizes 
of agreement with America’s greatness and SEI, when stratified by being discriminated against 
(Table 6). According to my hypothesis, I expect there to be significant differences in effect sizes 
of these two variables depending on whether or not sampled individuals have co-ethnic friends. 
Furthermore, in Table 7, I expect to see that the effect sizes of SEI (in Model 2) and of 
agreement with America’s greatness (in Model 4) significantly dampen upon adding in these two 
variables’ interactions with having co-ethnic friends. 
Hypothesis 5. I hypothesize that having high job prestige and not being discriminated 
against, both of which are a part of a positive context of reception, negatively moderate the 
effects of having agency, as covered by Hypothesis 4, on the chance that immigrants will judge 
their statuses as illegitimate, and therefore respond by expressing preference for their HL. I 
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operationalize this hypothesis in 4 ways: a) SEI will have a significant positive association with 
the judgment that America is great; b) being discriminated against will have a significant 
negative association with the judgment that America is great; c) SEI and being discriminated 
against will significantly interact in influencing HL preference; and d) being discriminated 
against and having co-ethnic friends will interact in influencing HL preference. 
Part a of Hypothesis 5 is addressed by part a of Hypothesis 4; these hypotheses predict 
opposing interaction effects. To address part c of Hypothesis 5, I run an analysis of variance test 
examining the effect of parental SEI on being discriminated against. Further testing part c, I 
examine Model 2 of Table 5, which build off of the base model by adding in the SEI*being 
discriminated against interaction. I expect to find that adding in this interaction will dampen the 
effect size of being discriminated against.  
To address parts b and d and to further examine part c, from the other direction, I 
examine the differences in effect sizes of agreement with America’s greatness, having co-ethnic 
friends, and SEI, when stratified by having reporting having been discriminated against (Table 
8). According to my hypothesis, I expect there to be significant differences in effect sizes of 
these three variables depending on whether or not sampled individuals have been discriminated 
against. Furthermore, in Table 9, I expect to see that the effect sizes of SEI (in Model 2), having 
co-ethnic friends (in Model 3), and agreement with America’s greatness (in Model 4) 
significantly dampen upon adding in these three variables’ interactions with being discriminated 
against. 
Finally, to address the reverse side of part d, I examine how the effect of being 
discriminated against differs depending on whether or not immigrants have co-ethnic friends 
(looking back at Table 6), and whether the effect size of being discriminated against dampens 
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significantly after controlling for the interaction between being discriminated against and having 
co-ethnic friends (look at Model 3 of Table 7). 
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Results 
 Testing Hypothesis 1. There is an overall heritage language preference rate of 31.3% 
amongst the immigrants surveyed in Wave 1 of the CILS database, including children with two 
parents from Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, Haiti, Laos, Nicaragua, Philippines, and Vietnam. The 
national origin-specific HL preference rates can be observed in Table 2. Overall, the percentage 
of immigrants that preferred speaking their HL most of the time differed significantly by national 
origin, c2(7, N = 3205) = 505.05, p < 0.001, supporting Hypothesis 1. According to Table 2, 
Mexico has the highest rate of HL preference (0.629); therefore, when running logit regressions 
with this data, Mexico was selected as the reference level. Supplementary Table S1 provides 
further detailed descriptive statistics by national origin. 
Testing Hypothesis 2. The percentage of immigrants that preferred speaking their HL 
differed significantly by context of reception variables: having co-ethnic friends, c2(1, N = 2844) 
= 7.27, p = 0.007; reporting having been discriminated against, c2(1, N = 3186) = 31.52, p < 
0.001; and combined parent socioeconomic index, t(823.16) = 10.34, p < 0.001. As seen in Table 
2, respondents who have co-ethnic friends and who report having been discriminated against 
have significantly higher chances of preferring their heritage language. Additionally, parental 
SEI is negatively associated with HL preference; respondents who prefer English have 
significantly lower combined parental SEI scores. This evidence supports the hypothesized 
presence of a relationship between context of reception factors and HL preference. 
 In Model 1 of Table 3, all national origin levels have significantly negative effect sizes 
when compared to Mexico as a reference national origin. Progressively adding context of 
reception variables and the interactions between these variables and national origin to the base 
model either dampens or strengthens the effect sizes of national origin. Adding in the original 
context of reception variables, without the interaction between the variable and national origin, 
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changes the effect sizes, but only does so slightly; dampening and strengthening effects generally 
take place more significantly upon adding in the interactions between the context of reception 
variables and national origin. This suggests that context of reception likely has more of a 
moderating, rather than a mediating effect, on the relationship between national origin and HL 
preference. Despite this, there are still many significant effect sizes of national origin levels, 
compared to Mexico, that are statistically significant, even after controlling for the interactions 
between national origin and context of reception. This includes the effect sizes of Cuba, 
Nicaragua, and the Philippines. 
 Testing Hypothesis 3. Upon examining Table 2 and running chi-squared tests, we see 
that immigrants who prefer their heritage language express significantly more agreement with 
the idea that the American way of life weakens family ties, c2(3, N = 3134) = 22.74, p < 0.001. 
Additionally, immigrants who prefer their heritage language express significantly less agreement 
with the idea that the United States is the best country, c2(3, N = 3166) = 52.47, p < 0.001. 
Table 4 shows that even after controlling for the effects of national origin, context of 
reception, the interaction between national origin and context of reception, and the controls, the 
effects of the studied judgment variables significantly influence HL preference. When each of 
the judgments are added to the base model individually in Models 2, they are significant, but 
when both of them are included in Model 4, the effect of agreeing with the first judgment 
variable becomes insignificant. For this reason, I conclude that I have enough evidence to accept 
Hypothesis 3. I choose to only examine agreement with the second judgment variable in later 
analyses as to avoid making the models too complicated. 
Testing Hypothesis 4. The effect of parental SEI on having co-ethnic friends is not 
statistically significant, F(1) = 2.44, p = 0.118. On the other hand, parental SEI has a significant 
effect on agreement with the United States being the best country, F(3) = 8.14, p < 0.001. 
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Contrary to what I predicted with Hypothesis 4, immigrants with higher parental SEI scores are 
more likely to agree that the United States is the best. I find similar results when examining this 
interaction in Table 5. 
In Table 5, upon adding in the effect of parental SEI, as well as the interaction between 
SEI and having co-ethnic friends, in Model 3, the originally significant positive effect size of 
having co-ethnic friends (0.473, p < 0.05) dampens so that it is no longer significant (0.056, p > 
0.10). Similarly, upon adding in SEI and the interaction between SEI and agreement with the 
United States being the best, in Model 4, the originally significant negative effect size of the 
judgment variable  (-0.528, p < 0.01) dampens so that it is no longer significant (-0.222, p > 
0.10). 
Tables 6 and 7 examine differences in effect sizes when controlling for variables’ 
interaction with having co-ethnic friends. Table 6 reveals that the negative effect of agreeing 
with the United States being the best, and the positive effect of being discriminated against, are 
only significant when immigrants have co-ethnic friends. It reveals an inconclusive relationship 
between the dependency of SEI’s effect size on having co-ethnic friends. 
In Table 7, upon adding in the effect of having co-ethnic friends, as well as the 
interaction between having co-ethnic friends and parental SEI, in Model 2, the originally 
significant negative effect size of parental SEI (-0.006, p < 0.05) dampens so that it is no longer 
significant (0.012, p > 0.10). Similarly, upon adding in the effect of having co-ethnic friends, as 
well as the interaction between having co-ethnic friends and strongly agreeing that the United 
States is the best, in Model 4, the originally significant negative effect size of strongly agreeing 
that the United States is the best (-0.515, p < 0.01) dampens so that it is no longer significant (-
0.115, p > 0.10). 
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Testing Hypothesis 5. The effect of parental SEI on being discriminated against is not 
statistically significant, F(1) = 2.68, p = 0.102. Despite this, in Model 2 of Table 5, upon adding 
in the effect of parental SEI, as well as the interaction between SEI and being discriminated 
against, the originally significant positive effect size of being discriminated against (0.326, p < 
0.01) dampens so that it is no longer significant (0.124, p > 0.10).  
Tables 8 and 9 examine differences in effect size when controlling for variables’ 
interaction with being discriminated against. Table 8 reveals that agreeing with the United States 
being the best does not depend on whether or not immigrants are discriminated against. On the 
other hand, the positive effect of having co-ethnic friends is only significant when immigrants 
are discriminated against. Also in Table 8, we see that the negative effect of parental SEI is 
significant when immigrants have not been discriminated against, but is not significant when 
they have been discriminated against. 
In Table 9, upon adding in the effect of being discriminated against, as well as the 
interaction between having being discriminated against and parental SEI, in Model 2, the 
originally significant negative effect size of parental SEI (-0.005, p < 0.05) increases (-0.008, p < 
0.05). Alternatively, upon adding in the effect of being discriminated against, as well as the 
interaction between being discriminated against and having co-ethnic friends, in Model 3, the 
originally significant positive effect size of having co-ethnic friends (0.477, p < 0.05) dampens 
so that it is no longer significant (0.271, p > 0.10). Finally, upon adding in the effect of being 
discriminated against, as well as the interaction between being discriminated against and 
agreeing that the United States is the best, in Model 4, the originally significant negative effect 
size of agreeing that the United States is the best (-0.547, p < 0.01) only dampens slightly (-
0.487, p < 0.05). 
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 Looking back at Table 6, the positive effect of being discriminated against is only 
significant when immigrants have co-ethnic friends. In Model 3 of Table 7, upon adding in the 
effect of having co-ethnic friends, as well as the interaction between having co-ethnic friends and 
being discriminated against, the originally significant positive effect size of being discriminated 
against (0.344, p < 0.01) dampens so that it is no longer significant (0.015, p > 0.10). 
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Discussion 
Upon stepping back to observe the overall trends I described in detail in the previous 
section, I find support for ELIT as a possible explanation of the variation in HL preference 
amongst the 1.5 and second generation immigrants studied in this project. I find that I can accept 
hypotheses 1 and 2, which claim that variance in HL preference is influenced by national origin-
specific context of reception factors. I also find possible support for hypothesis 3, which states 
that immigrants who judge their ethnolinguistic groups’ culture as valuable in comparison to that 
of dominant society are more likely to signal their ethnic identity via HL preference. Finally, I 
find that hypotheses 4 and 5 are more complicated than I had originally predicted, but find strong 
support behind ELIT, as a whole, in influencing the way HL preference varies amongst 
immigrants. 
National Origin, Context of Reception, and HL Preference. Overall, the percentage of 
immigrants studied in the CILS database who preferred speaking their heritage language most of 
the time varied significantly by national origin, having co-ethnic friends, reporting having been 
discriminated against, and combined parental socioeconomic status. Adding the interaction 
effects of context of reception and national origin to a logit regression model of HL preference 
explains much of the effect of national origin on HL preference. This suggests that national 
origin-dependent context of reception factors might, as hypothesized, influence HL preference. It 
is also important to notice, however, that despite adding in these controls, the individual effects 
of national origin are still significant for many national origins compared to Mexico. Considering 
this, it is likely that there are other factors, other than the three context of reception factors I 
examine as a part of ELIT theory, that explain why HL preference depends on national origin. I 
discuss these possibilities in my limitations section. 
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Judgments about Dominant Society and EV. Immigrants who preferred their HL 
expressed significantly more agreement with the judgment that the American way of life 
weakens family ties and expressed significantly less agreement with the judgment that the United 
States is the best country. When running these variables in a regression analysis on HL 
preference, their effect sizes remained statistically significant, despite controlling for the 
individual and interaction effects of national origin and context of reception variables. In my 
operationalization of Hypothesis 3, I assumed that those who agree that the American way of life 
weakens family ties and disagree that the United States is the greatest country are more likely to 
judge their ideal EV as high, in comparison to dominant society, and are thus more likely to 
express ethnic markers as described in ELIT. Considering that these judgment variables have 
significant effect sizes in influencing HL preference, with the directional effects I hypothesized 
would exist, I find support for Hypothesis 3. 
It is important to note again some of the national origin effect sizes remain significant 
(including that of Nicaragua and the Philippines, relative to Mexico), suggesting that even upon 
controlling for the effect of judgment variables, there are still likely national origin-specific 
effects of national origin that I am not accounting for in my operationalization of ELIT. Also, 
one should consider that it is possible that other variables, separate from ELIT theory, may 
explain the observed relationship between these judgments and HL preference. 
Ethnic Agency, Judgments about EV, and HL Preference. Hypothesis 4 addresses the 
side of ELIT in which immigrants judge their EVs as unstable and able to be changed, as 
mediated by their ethnic agency. This hypothesis is based on the idea that even if immigrants 
have the motivation to prioritize increasing their status, if they do not have at least a base level of 
capital, both social (via their having co-ethnic friends) and economic (via parents’ SEI), then 
they will not prioritize emphasizing their ethnic identity via ELIT.  
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Considering this hypothesis, I expected to observe significant interaction effects of SEI 
and having co-ethnic friends on judgments about the United States being the best. Immigrants 
with higher SEI scores had significantly higher rates of agreement with the United States being 
the best. While this aligns with my expectations for Hypothesis 5, this does not confirm the part 
of Hypothesis 4 that assumed that there would be a conditional positive effect of SEI on 
agreement that the United States is the best.  
The other context of reception factor, which does show a significant interaction effect 
with the agreement that the United States is the best, is having co-ethnic friends. The negative 
effect of agreement that the United States is the best is significant in negatively influencing HL 
preference when immigrants report having co-ethnic friends, but not when they do not have co-
ethnic friends. In other words, this can be interpreted as: immigrants only judge their EV as 
illegitimate (represented by the negative effect size of agreement with the judgment variable on 
HL preference) whenever they have co-ethnic friends and thus have the ethnic agency to respond 
in such a way. Parental economic capital might not have as much of an effect as I had originally 
hypothesized, but having social capital appears to be important in moderating the effect of the 
judgment variable on HL preference via ethnic agency, as predicted by ELIT. 
 HL Preference and the Motivation to Improve EV. Hypothesis 5 addresses the side of 
ELIT that discusses the factors that increase the likelihood that immigrants will judge their EV as 
illegitimate. It involves immigrants recognizing their status and having the motivation to signal 
and increase their ethnolinguistic vitality. I hypothesize that lower status, which I operationalize 
as reporting being discriminated against and having less parental economic capital (via combined 
parental SEI scores), leads immigrants to have increased motivation to judge the dominant 
society’s culture’s value as less than that of their own community. Considering this, I expected to 
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observe significant relationships between agreeing that the United States is the best, being 
discriminated against, and SEI score. 
I noticed that as hypothesized, and as previously described, immigrants with higher SEI 
scores reported significantly higher agreement that the United States is the best. This is 
consistent with one of the sides of ELIT, in which having a low SEI increases awareness of one’s 
lower EV and therefore makes immigrants more likely to judge their status as illegitimate. 
Interestingly, the other factor I hypothesized would significantly regulate the effect of judging 
one’s status as illegitimate – being discriminated against – did not have a significant interaction 
effect.  
While discrimination did not directly affect the effect size of agreement that the United 
States is the best on HL preference, it did impact the effect of SEI on HL preference, which is 
interesting, considering that both of these were hypothesized to influence the likelihood 
immigrants would judge their low EV as illegitimate. When immigrants reported being 
discriminated against, there was not a significant effect of SEI on HL preference, yet when they 
were not discriminated against, there was a significant negative effect of SEI on HL preference. 
In other words, it is possible that discrimination carries the main effect in determining how 
immigrants will judge “illegitimacy,” but that when discrimination is absent, having a low SEI 
can “pick up the slack” of this absence of discrimination and signal to immigrants that there is 
something worth pushing against to preserve their EV. This suggests that SEI might indeed be 
important in regulating the likelihood that immigrants will judge their low EV as illegitimate, but 
that this only has such an effect when immigrants report not being discriminated against.  
 The Interaction between Ethnic Agency and Motivation to Improve EV. While 
being discriminated against did not regulate the effect of agreement with the United States being 
the best on HL preference, it did regulate the effect of having co-ethnic friends on HL 
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preference. The effect of having co-ethnic friends on HL preference was positively significant 
when immigrants were discriminated against, but not when they were not discriminated against. 
The inverse was true, as well; the effect of being discriminated against was positively significant 
when immigrants had co-ethnic friends, but not when they did not have co-ethnic friends. This 
interesting interaction between discrimination and the effect of having co-ethnic friends mirrors 
the hypothesized effects of having ethnic agency and motivation to judge one’s EV as 
illegitimate. Having co-ethnic friends, and the ethnic agency that results from this, is only 
significant in influencing HL preference when immigrants are discriminated against and thus 
have the motivation to judge their EV as illegitimate.  
While my operationalizations of hypotheses 4 and 5 were not always significant in the 
ways I expected them to be, the results support the overall theory behind these hypotheses. ELIT 
is a significant possible explanation of the variation in HL preference amongst immigrants 
included in this analysis. I provide significant support for the possibility that immigrants weigh 
the social value of their ethnolinguistic community, and make decisions as to whether or not they 
will attempt to improve their community’s value by signaling HL preference, depending on them 
having the following two factors: 1) having sufficient motivation to improve their status, and 2) 
having the agency to do so.  
Overlooked Complexity 
This study is unique because it is does not focus on the typical modes of incorporation 
that influence immigrants’ assimilation into society. Rather than focusing on the ways in which 
immigrants weigh the economic costs and benefits of expressing certain ethnic markers, I focus 
on how immigrants construct certain individual-level judgments about their ethnolinguistic 
vitality. I aim to understand the ways in which individuals judge their EV’s illegitimacy and 
instability within dominant society, as influenced by context of reception factors. The goal of this 
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paper is to present ELIT as a possible explanation of the decision making that immigrants 
undergo when deciding to selectively acculturate. Considering this, here are a few factors that 
could influence HL preference in a way I did not control for. These are factors that need to be 
included in future studies of ELIT to further defend the theory: 
 Longitudinal Effects. One important limitation of this study to consider regards the 
notion of causality. While ELIT explains theoretically how being discriminated against can 
cause immigrants to signal ethnic markers, the regression analyses I conducted do not permit 
such conclusions to be made. In fact, it is possible that conducting this study longitudinally could 
have revealed that HL preference influences discrimination, SEI, and having co-ethnic friends, 
rather than the other way around. I would need to examine how attitudes change and strengthen 
over time, with changes in the other variables, to get at the idea of causality. 
Immigrant replenishment. Immigrant replenishment also could have influenced the 
results. Immigrant replenishment results in more intergroup boundaries, in which Mexican 
Americans distinguish themselves from non-Mexican Americans via a) experiences of “anti-
immigrant antipathy” and b) increased saliency of race in their daily lives as they pertain to 
identifying as Mexican American. It also results in more intragroup boundaries, in which newly 
arrived Mexican immigrants define Mexican authenticity, creating the boundaries in which 
native-born Mexican Americans are judged to be either in or out of (Jiménez 2008, p. 1530). 
Other scholars have found that immigrant replenishment is strongly tied to intermarriage and the 
odds of speaking Spanish at home (Sosa, 2018). This can be explained in part by the fact that 
“new immigrants may bring more up-to-date versions of the sending society’s culture to ethnic 
communities” (Foner and Kasinitz, 2007, p. 271). Cubans, for example, are reportedly very 
conscious of the historical differences between themselves and the “exile generation,” as they 
tend to have lower rates of replenishment (Foner and Kasinitz, 2007). Mexicans, on the other 
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hand, have much higher replenishment rates, increasing their likelihood of speaking their HL at 
home and possibly increasing their ethnolinguistic identity’s salience (Sosa, 2018). 
Race and Pan-Ethnicity. Another limitation to my study is that I focused on immigrants 
who reported having two parents from the same country. I focused on the effect of national 
origins, when I could have focused on pan-ethnic identities, such as Hispanic or Asian, which 
could have influenced HL preference differently, as well as the definition of the “co-ethnic 
friends” variable. It is possible that immigrants with different national origins “assimilate” into 
different racial categories. For example, immigrants from Cambodia and Vietnam, despite 
speaking different languages, are racialized into the pan-ethnic “Asian American” racial 
category, in which English is a lingua franca. Immigrants from Cuba and Mexico, on the other 
hand, who come from Spanish speaking countries, are racialized into the pan-ethnic “Hispanic” 
racial category, and are more easily able to maintain bilingualism in both Spanish and English 
(Mouw and Xie, 1999) 
Allowing for equal preference for both HL and English. The final limitation of this 
study is that the first wave of CILS did not allow respondents to say that they preferred speaking 
their HL and English equally. If this had been an option, it is possible that the results would have 
been different. This would have allowed for the possibility of biculturalism. In spite of this, 
however, it is still interesting that variation in preference differs so significantly depending on 
national origin, even without having the option to report equal preference for both. 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
More research needs to be done examining the ways in which immigrants construct their 
ethnic identities via language preference. HL preference is not just a function of signaling one’s 
identity according to what makes the most sense, economically; it is a function of ethnic agency 
that is constrained by social capital, as well as the status individuals perceive is ascribed to their 
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ethnolinguistic group. The perception of ethnic agency, and factors influencing the saliency of 
their lower status that influence language preference, influence how immigrants construct 
judgments about their ideal EV.  
It is likely that economic factors and institutional effects explain part of the variation in 
HL preference, as is described in segmented assimilation theory, but it is very likely that 
ethnolinguistic identity theory is significant as well. Moving forward, researchers need to control 
for both economic decision-making factors and ELIT factors, as to understand how these factors 
work together, work in opposition, or interact in complex ways. Also, sociologists need to ask 
more questions about perceived in-group status, as it relates to the concept of ethnolinguistic 
vitality, the ability of an ethnolinguistic community to survive as a distinct collective entity 
amongst other ethnolinguistic communities. This study suggests that a strong relationship 
between ideal EV and context of reception exists.  
By studying ethnolinguistic identity theory (ELIT), I am not arguing that immigrants do 
not weigh the costs and benefits of selective acculturation. I am arguing, however, that by 
focusing only on selective acculturation and segmented assimilation into society, researchers are 
overlooking the non-economic, individual-level ethnic meaning that immigrants construct in 
response to specific combinations of context of reception factors. Especially since this dataset’s 
initial collection, immigration has become increasingly politicized. Public discourse on 
immigration is likely to continue to increase in complexity as the United States’ immigration 
concentration increases. With this, it becomes even more important that education scholars and 
policy makers understand the complex ethnic identity construction that children of immigrants 
undergo (Cervantes-Soon, 2014). By not moving towards studying ethnic identity construction in 
a way that goes on beyond segmented assimilation, sociologists and education scholars will 
 
 41 
 
continue to miss the rich ethnic decision making that immigrants undergo during their 
incorporation into American society. 
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  Tables 
Table 1. Description of Variables Used in the Analysis  
Variable Description Mean SD 
Prefers heritage language Reporting a non-English language when asked, “What language do 
you prefer to speak most of the time?” 
0
.313 
  
Combined parent SEI The sum of the mothers’ and fathers’ socioeconomic index scores 69.711 29.016 
Has co-ethnic friends Reported having close friends whose parents who were born in the 
same country as the respondents’ parents 
0.931   
Reported discrimination Reported having been discriminated against 0.550  
Judgment about American Life Response to: “The American way of life weakens the family.”   
      Agree a lot 0.125   
      Agree a little 0.328  
      Disagree a little 0.362   
      Disagree a lot* 0.185  
Judgment about the U.S. as best Response to: “There is no better country to live in than the U.S.”   
      Agree a lot 0.328   
      Agree a little 0.282  
      Disagree a little 0.235   
      Disagree a lot* 0.155  
Control Variables:    
Father arrival year Approximate year respondent’s father came to the U.S. 77.101 8.534 
Mother arrival year Approximate year respondent’s mother came to the U.S. 77.784 8.375 
Sex Sex (1=Male, 0=Female) 0.507   
Age Age 14.246 0.869 
Has citizenship status Respondent is a U.S. citizen 0.652   
Is 1.5 generation Respondent is a foreign-born 1.5 generation immigrant, rather than a 
native-born second generation immigrant 
0.438   
Time Lived in the U.S. Time living in the U.S.   
      Whole life 0.409  
      Five to nine years 0.222   
      Ten or more years 0.288  
      Less than five* 0.081   
Metropolitan area  Metropolitan area respondent lives in   
      Miami/Ft. Lauderdale* 0.478  
      San Diego 0.522   
Parent English knowledge Indexed score denoting how well a parent can speak and write English 2.714 0.943 
Home non-English frequency Frequency in which a non-English language is spoken at home   
      Always 0.567   
      From time to time or never 0.403  
      Seldom or never* 0.029   
Note: For dummy variables, only the sample mean is given 
* Set as the reference value in logit regressions 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of variables used in analysis stratified by 
language preference: 1.5 and second generation immigrant children from CILS 
Wave 1 with two parents from Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, Haiti, Laos, 
Nicaragua, Philippines, and Vietnam. 
 Prefer English Prefer HL  
 Proportion Proportion N 
National Origin    
     Mexico 0.372 0.629 551 
     Colombia 0.667 0.333 144 
     Cuba 0.82 0.180 934 
     Haiti 0.814 0.186 140 
     Laos 0.545 0.455 191 
     Nicaragua 0.734 0.266 293 
     Philippines 0.862 0.138 625 
     Vietnam 0.502 0.498 327 
Has co-ethnic friends    
     False 0.783 0.217 198 
     True 0.692 0.308 2646 
Reported discrimination    
     False 0.739 0.261 1431 
     True 0.647 0.353 1755 
Judgment about American Life    
     Agree a lot 0.617 0.383 392 
     Agree a little 0.660 0.340 1028 
     Disagree a little 0.724 0.276 1136 
     Disagree a lot 0.721 0.279 578 
Judgment about the U.S. as best    
     Agree a lot 0.768 0.232 1039 
     Agree a little 0.679 0.321 897 
     Disagree a little 0.633 0.367 743 
     Disagree a lot 0.620 0.380 487 
 Mean SD Mean SD N 
Combined parent SEI 72.920 29.058 59.669 25.830 1726 
Note: For dummy variables, only the sample mean is given 
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Table 3: Logistic regression modeling the effect sizes of national origin and controls on heritage language preference. As models 
progress, context of reception variables and their interactions with national origin are added in. 
 Model 1: 
Base 
Model 2: 
+ SEI 
Model 3: 
+ SEI 
Interactions 
Model 4: 
+ Discrim. 
Model 5: 
+Discrim.. 
Interactions 
Model 6: 
+Co-Ethnic 
Friends 
Model 7: 
+Co-Ethnic 
Friends 
Interactions 
 
National Origin        
     Colombia -0.773* -0.715 -0.943 -0.983 -0.981 -0.934 -1.147 
 (0.448) (0.448) (0.762) (0.767) (0.806) (0.806) (1.038) 
     Cuba -1.181*** -1.137*** -1.519*** -1.479** -1.567*** -1.605*** -1.530* 
 (0.425) (0.425) (0.582) (0.583) (0.593) (0.594) (0.908) 
     Haiti -1.367*** -1.390*** -2.102*** -2.149*** -2.167*** -2.200*** -2.413 
 (0.471) (0.472) (0.772) (0.776) (0.830) (0.836) (1.472) 
     Laos -1.043*** -0.968*** -0.800 -0.826 -0.457 -0.453 -1.149 
 (0.195) (0.198) (0.536) (0.534) (0.601) (0.601) (0.990) 
     Nicaragua -1.313*** -1.263*** -1.614** -1.642*** -1.686** -1.647** -1.792** 
 (0.437) (0.438) (0.632) (0.634) (0.656) (0.657) (0.898) 
     Philippines -2.353*** -2.293*** -2.129*** -2.161*** -1.774*** -1.780*** -2.303* 
 (0.192) (0.193) (0.523) (0.525) (0.559) (0.559) (1.319) 
     Vietnam -0.881*** -0.796*** -0.615 -0.643 -0.368 -0.359 0.209 
 (0.161) (0.165) (0.451) (0.454) (0.497) (0.500) (0.795) 
Combined Parent SEI  -0.006** -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
  (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Colombia*Combined Parent SEI   0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 
   (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Cuba*Combined Parent SEI   0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 
   (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Haiti*Combined Parent SEI   0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 
   (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Laos*Combined Parent SEI   -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 
   (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Nicaragua*Combined Parent SEI   0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
   (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Philippines*Combined Parent SEI   -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
   (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Vietnam*Combined Parent SEI   -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
   (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Reported Discrimination    0.365*** 0.457** 0.447** 0.447** 
    (0.093) (0.199) (0.199) (0.200) 
Colombia*Reported Discrimination     -0.035 -0.082 -0.111 
     (0.422) (0.423) (0.428) 
Cuba*Reported Discrimination     0.262 0.280 0.279 
     (0.267) (0.268) (0.269) 
Haiti*Reported Discrimination     0.007 0.005 0.002 
     (0.542) (0.543) (0.545) 
Laos*Reported Discrimination     -0.564 -0.554 -0.562 
     (0.400) (0.401) (0.406) 
Nicaragua*Reported Discrimination     0.058 0.056 0.053 
     (0.344) (0.345) (0.347) 
Philippines*Reported Discrimination     -0.599* -0.598* -0.605* 
     (0.325) (0.325) (0.326) 
Vietnam*Reported Discrimination     -0.425 -0.413 -0.414 
     (0.330) (0.331) (0.331) 
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Has Co-Ethnic Friends      0.455** 0.435 
      (0.193) (0.537) 
Colombia*Has Co-Ethnic Friends       0.272 
       (0.755) 
Cuba*Has Co-Ethnic Friends       -0.068 
       (0.728) 
Haiti*Has Co-Ethnic Friends       0.221 
       (1.249) 
Laos*Has Co-Ethnic Friends       0.754 
       (0.858) 
Nicaragua*Has Co-Ethnic Friends       0.176 
       (0.689) 
Philippines*Has Co-Ethnic Friends       0.543 
       (1.215) 
Vietnam*Has Co-Ethnic Friends       -0.618 
       (0.661) 
Constant -3.952*** -3.396** -3.402** -3.694** -3.740** -4.182*** -4.169** 
 (1.528) (1.543) (1.583) (1.591) (1.596) (1.615) (1.676) 
 
Observations 3,227 3,227 3,227 3,227 3,227 3,227 3,227 
Note: Control variables are hidden from this table. See Table S1 for the table with visible control effects. 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
  
 
 51 
 
Table 4: Logistic regression modeling the effect sizes of national origin, controls, context of reception 
variables, and the interactions between context of reception variables and national origin, on HL 
preference. With progressing models, ELIT variables said to effect HL preference are added in. 
 Model 1: Base 
Model 2: 
+ “American 
Way of Life 
Weakens 
the Family” 
Model 3: 
+ “There is 
No Better 
Country to 
Live in than 
the U.S.” 
Model 4: 
+Both 
Agreement with the American Way of Life 
Weakening Family Ties     
     Disagrees a little  -0.040  -0.084 
  (0.134)  (0.136) 
     Agrees a little  0.165  0.116 
  (0.135)  (0.137) 
     Agrees a lot  0.333**  0.268 
  (0.164)  (0.166) 
Agreement with the U.S. Being the Best     
     Disagrees a little   -0.008 0.005 
   (0.142) (0.143) 
     Agrees a little   -0.157 -0.147 
   (0.140) (0.141) 
     Agrees a lot   -0.523*** -0.503*** 
   (0.141) (0.142) 
National Origin     
     Colombia -1.147 -1.146 -1.126 -1.127 
 (1.038) (1.041) (1.041) (1.044) 
     Cuba -1.530* -1.551* -1.455 -1.483 
 (0.908) (0.914) (0.913) (0.919) 
     Haiti -2.413 -2.414* -2.396 -2.394 
 (1.472) (1.467) (1.481) (1.476) 
     Laos -1.149 -1.215 -1.203 -1.265 
 (0.990) (0.998) (1.001) (1.008) 
     Nicaragua -1.792** -1.774** -1.651* -1.645* 
 (0.898) (0.902) (0.905) (0.909) 
     Philippines -2.303* -2.290* -2.319* -2.301* 
 (1.319) (1.325) (1.329) (1.334) 
     Vietnam 0.209 0.199 0.288 0.276 
 (0.795) (0.798) (0.799) (0.802) 
Combined Parent SEI -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Reported Discrimination 0.447** 0.426** 0.475** 0.454** 
 (0.200) (0.200) (0.201) (0.202) 
Has Co-Ethnic Friends 0.435 0.445 0.410 0.420 
 (0.537) (0.537) (0.540) (0.540) 
Colombia*Combined Parent SEI 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Cuba*Combined Parent SEI 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Haiti*Combined Parent SEI 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Laos*Combined Parent SEI -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Nicaragua*Combined Parent SEI 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
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Philippines*Combined Parent SEI -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Vietnam*Combined Parent SEI -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Colombia*Reported Discrimination -0.111 -0.161 -0.160 -0.197 
 (0.428) (0.429) (0.430) (0.431) 
Cuba*Reported Discrimination 0.279 0.271 0.227 0.222 
 (0.269) (0.269) (0.270) (0.271) 
Haiti*Reported Discrimination 0.002 0.032 -0.090 -0.061 
 (0.545) (0.546) (0.548) (0.548) 
Laos*Reported Discrimination -0.562 -0.565 -0.614 -0.615 
 (0.406) (0.408) (0.409) (0.411) 
Nicaragua*Reported Discrimination 0.053 0.043 -0.039 -0.044 
 (0.347) (0.348) (0.349) (0.350) 
Philippines*Reported Discrimination -0.605* -0.623* -0.650** -0.660** 
 (0.326) (0.327) (0.328) (0.329) 
Vietnam*Reported Discrimination -0.414 -0.455 -0.518 -0.552* 
 (0.331) (0.331) (0.333) (0.334) 
Colombia*Has Co-Ethnic Friends 0.272 0.297 0.315 0.339 
 (0.755) (0.755) (0.758) (0.759) 
Cuba*Has Co-Ethnic Friends -0.068 -0.031 -0.043 -0.007 
 (0.728) (0.731) (0.733) (0.735) 
Haiti*Has Co-Ethnic Friends 0.221 0.274 0.213 0.266 
 (1.249) (1.249) (1.257) (1.255) 
Laos*Has Co-Ethnic Friends 0.754 0.798 0.891 0.931 
 (0.858) (0.862) (0.861) (0.866) 
Nicaragua*Has Co-Ethnic Friends 0.176 0.157 0.149 0.138 
 (0.689) (0.691) (0.692) (0.694) 
Philippines*Has Co-Ethnic Friends 0.543 0.558 0.642 0.643 
 (1.215) (1.221) (1.225) (1.231) 
Vietnam*Has Co-Ethnic Friends -0.618 -0.623 -0.574 -0.579 
 (0.661) (0.664) (0.665) (0.668) 
Constant -4.169** -4.000** -4.068** -3.889** 
 (1.676) (1.682) (1.683) (1.689) 
 
Observations 3,227 3,227 3,227 3,227 
Note: Control variables are hidden from this table. See Table S2 for the table with visible control effects. 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 5: Logistic regression modeling the effect of national origin, context of reception variables, and judgment variables on 
HL preference. Models progress by adding in interactions between parental SEI and other context of reception and judgment 
variables. 
 
Model 1: 
Base 
Model 2: 
SEI * 
Discrimination 
Interaction 
Model 3: 
SEI *  
Co-Ethnic 
Friends 
Interaction 
Model 4: 
SEI *  
“U.S. is 
the Best” 
Model 5: 
All 
SEI 
Interactions 
 
National Origin      
     Colombia -0.730 -0.677 -0.674 -0.680 -0.678 
 (0.455) (0.455) (0.456) (0.456) (0.456) 
     Cuba -1.098** -1.065** -1.061** -1.064** -1.074** 
 (0.432) (0.432) (0.434) (0.434) (0.434) 
     Haiti -1.501*** -1.533*** -1.524*** -1.527*** -1.536*** 
 (0.478) (0.478) (0.480) (0.479) (0.479) 
     Laos -0.985*** -0.914*** -0.917*** -0.912*** -0.913*** 
 (0.198) (0.201) (0.201) (0.202) (0.202) 
     Nicaragua -1.288*** -1.249*** -1.244*** -1.252*** -1.261*** 
 (0.444) (0.445) (0.447) (0.446) (0.446) 
     Philippines -2.376*** -2.320*** -2.322*** -2.314*** -2.323*** 
 (0.195) (0.195) (0.196) (0.196) (0.196) 
     Vietnam -0.814*** -0.734*** -0.735*** -0.728*** -0.730*** 
 (0.164) (0.167) (0.167) (0.168) (0.168) 
Combined Parent SEI  -0.008** -0.012 -0.001 -0.009 
  (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) 
Reported Discrimination 0.326*** 0.124 0.338*** 0.335*** 0.124 
 (0.093) (0.248) (0.093) (0.094) (0.248) 
Has Co-Ethnic Friends 0.473** 0.462** 0.056 0.459** 0.070 
 (0.192) (0.193) (0.520) (0.193) (0.523) 
Agreement with the U.S. Being the Best      
     Disagrees a little -0.021 -0.014 -0.015 0.367 0.352 
 (0.141) (0.141) (0.141) (0.378) (0.379) 
     Agrees a little -0.160 -0.156 -0.155 0.207 0.204 
 (0.139) (0.139) (0.139) (0.364) (0.365) 
     Agrees a lot -0.528*** -0.510*** -0.514*** -0.222 -0.231 
 (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) (0.370) (0.370) 
Combined Parent SEI*Reported Discrimination  0.004   0.003 
  (0.004)   (0.004) 
Combined Parent SEI*Has Co-Ethnic Friends   0.007  0.006 
   (0.008)  (0.008) 
Combined Parent SEI*Disagrees a little    -0.006 -0.006 
    (0.006) (0.006) 
Combined Parent SEI*Agrees a little    -0.006 -0.006 
    (0.006) (0.006) 
Combined Parent SEI*Agrees a lot    -0.005 -0.005 
    (0.006) (0.006) 
Constant -4.576*** -3.846** -3.669** -4.321*** -3.776** 
 (1.567) (1.600) (1.646) (1.602) (1.692) 
Observations 3,227 3,227 3,227 3,227 3,227 
Note: Control variables are hidden from this table. See Table S3 for the table with visible control effects. 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 6: Logistic regression modeling the effect of national origin, context of 
reception variables, and judgment variables on HL preference. Contrasts the 
effects when immigrants do and do not have co-ethnic friends. 
 
Model 1: 
Base 
Model 2: 
Does Not 
Have 
Co-Ethnic  
Friends 
Model 3: 
Has 
Co-Ethnic 
Friends 
National Origin    
     Colombia -0.718 0.543 -0.652 
 (0.453) (1,104.107) (0.525) 
     Cuba -1.022** 0.677 -1.090** 
 (0.431) (1,104.108) (0.499) 
     Haiti -1.506*** -0.437 -1.543*** 
 (0.477) (1,104.108) (0.539) 
     Laos -0.942*** -2.929*** -0.781*** 
 (0.200) (1.119) (0.213) 
     Nicaragua -1.269*** -0.194 -1.233** 
 (0.443) (1,104.108) (0.513) 
     Philippines -2.305*** -3.540* -2.321*** 
 (0.195) (1.854) (0.201) 
     Vietnam -0.764*** -0.883 -0.765*** 
 (0.167) (0.887) (0.177) 
Combined Parent SEI -0.006** -0.009 -0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) 
Reported Discrimination 0.344*** 0.030 0.362*** 
 (0.093) (0.448) (0.098) 
Agreement with the U.S. Being the Best    
     Disagrees a little -0.025 -0.159 -0.005 
 (0.141) (0.629) (0.148) 
     Agrees a little -0.156 -0.361 -0.131 
 (0.139) (0.706) (0.146) 
     Agrees a lot -0.515*** -0.048 -0.545*** 
 (0.140) (0.635) (0.147) 
Constant -3.573** -24.469 -3.365** 
 (1.559) (1,467.254) (1.618) 
Observations 3,227 256 2,971 
Note: Control variables are hidden from this table. See Table S6 for the table with 
visible control effects. 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 7: Logistic regression modeling the effect of national origin, context of reception variables, and judgment 
variables on HL preference. Models progress by adding in interactions between having co-ethnic friends and 
other context of reception and judgment variables. 
 
Model 1: 
Base 
Model 2: 
Co-Ethnic 
Friends * 
SEI 
Interaction 
Model 3: 
Co-Ethnic 
Friends * 
Discrimination 
Interaction 
Model 4: 
Co-Ethnic 
Friends * 
“U.S. is 
the Best” 
Model 5: 
All 
Co-Ethnic 
Friends 
Interactions 
National Origin      
     Colombia -0.718 -0.674 -0.683 -0.672 -0.673 
 (0.453) (0.456) (0.456) (0.458) (0.459) 
     Cuba -1.022** -1.061** -1.046** -1.057** -1.050** 
 (0.431) (0.434) (0.434) (0.435) (0.437) 
     Haiti -1.506*** -1.524*** -1.518*** -1.524*** -1.519*** 
 (0.477) (0.480) (0.479) (0.480) (0.482) 
     Laos -0.942*** -0.917*** -0.912*** -0.901*** -0.900*** 
 (0.200) (0.201) (0.201) (0.201) (0.202) 
     Nicaragua -1.269*** -1.244*** -1.236*** -1.254*** -1.251*** 
 (0.443) (0.447) (0.446) (0.448) (0.449) 
     Philippines -2.305*** -2.322*** -2.317*** -2.318*** -2.324*** 
 (0.195) (0.196) (0.195) (0.195) (0.196) 
     Vietnam -0.764*** -0.735*** -0.729*** -0.730*** -0.727*** 
 (0.167) (0.167) (0.168) (0.168) (0.168) 
 (0.409) (0.410) (0.410) (0.410) (0.410) 
Has Co-Ethnic Friends  0.056 0.271 0.466 -0.132 
  (0.520) (0.278) (0.442) (0.688) 
Combined Parent SEI -0.006** -0.012 -0.005** -0.005** -0.012 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) 
Reported Discrimination 0.344*** 0.338*** 0.015 0.338*** 0.051 
 (0.093) (0.093) (0.357) (0.094) (0.363) 
Agreement with the U.S. Being the Best      
     Disagrees a little -0.025 -0.015 -0.019 -0.162 -0.156 
 (0.141) (0.141) (0.141) (0.536) (0.545) 
     Agrees a little -0.156 -0.155 -0.158 -0.471 -0.474 
 (0.139) (0.139) (0.139) (0.574) (0.579) 
     Agrees a lot -0.515*** -0.514*** -0.517*** -0.115 -0.124 
 (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) (0.524) (0.532) 
Has Co-Ethnic Friends*Combined Parent SEI  0.007   0.007 
  (0.008)   (0.008) 
Has Co-Ethnic Friends*Reported Discrimination   0.349  0.311 
   (0.373)  (0.380) 
Has Co-Ethnic Friends*Disagrees a little    0.157 0.151 
    (0.562) (0.571) 
Has Co-Ethnic Friends*Agrees a little    0.334 0.337 
    (0.599) (0.604) 
Has Co-Ethnic Friends*Agrees a lot    -0.434 -0.425 
    (0.552) (0.560) 
Constant -3.573** -3.669** -3.853** -4.038** -3.495** 
 (1.559) (1.646) (1.587) (1.614) (1.684) 
 
Observations 3,227 3,227 3,227 3,227 3,227 
Note: Control variables are hidden from this table. See Table S7 for the table with visible control effects. 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 8: Logistic regression modeling the effect of national origin, context of 
reception variables, and judgment variables on HL preference. Contrasts the 
effects when immigrants are not discriminated against, versus when they are not. 
 
Model 1: 
Base 
Model 2: 
Reports 
Not Being 
Discriminated 
Against 
Model 3: 
Reports 
Being 
Discriminated 
Against 
National Origin    
     Colombia -0.681 0.860 -1.562** 
 (0.455) (0.856) (0.615) 
     Cuba -1.086** 0.407 -1.802*** 
 (0.434) (0.840) (0.585) 
     Haiti -1.465*** -0.049 -2.404*** 
 (0.479) (0.925) (0.632) 
     Laos -0.881*** -0.621* -1.039*** 
 (0.200) (0.351) (0.251) 
     Nicaragua -1.208*** 0.180 -2.053*** 
 (0.446) (0.853) (0.598) 
     Philippines -2.288*** -1.879*** -2.617*** 
 (0.194) (0.309) (0.251) 
     Vietnam -0.705*** -0.475 -0.879*** 
 (0.167) (0.292) (0.210) 
Combined Parent SEI -0.005** -0.007* -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
Has Co-Ethnic Friends 0.477** 0.257 0.630** 
 (0.192) (0.285) (0.262) 
Agreement with the U.S. Being the Best    
     Disagrees a little -0.036 -0.169 0.071 
 (0.141) (0.231) (0.181) 
     Agrees a little -0.177 -0.136 -0.196 
 (0.139) (0.226) (0.179) 
     Agrees a lot -0.547*** -0.527** -0.535*** 
 (0.139) (0.226) (0.183) 
Constant -3.742** -4.584* -3.591* 
 (1.574) (2.412) (2.112) 
Observations 3,227 1,450 1,777 
Note: Control variables are hidden from this table. See Table S4 for the table with 
visible control effects. 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 9: Logistic regression modeling the effect of national origin, context of reception variables, and judgment 
variables on HL preference. Models progress by adding in interactions between being discriminated against and other 
context of reception and judgment variables. 
 
Model 1: 
Base 
Model 2: 
Discrimination  
* SEI 
Interaction 
Model 3: 
Discrimination 
* Co-Ethnic 
Friends 
Interaction 
Model 4: 
Discrimination 
* “U.S. is 
the Best” 
Model 5: 
All 
Discrimination 
Interactions 
National Origin      
     Colombia -0.681 -0.677 -0.683 -0.674 -0.682 
 (0.455) (0.455) (0.456) (0.457) (0.456) 
     Cuba -1.086** -1.065** -1.046** -1.058** -1.055** 
 (0.434) (0.432) (0.434) (0.434) (0.434) 
     Haiti -1.465*** -1.533*** -1.518*** -1.536*** -1.541*** 
 (0.479) (0.478) (0.479) (0.480) (0.480) 
     Laos -0.881*** -0.914*** -0.912*** -0.926*** -0.922*** 
 (0.200) (0.201) (0.201) (0.201) (0.201) 
     Nicaragua -1.208*** -1.249*** -1.236*** -1.249*** -1.252*** 
 (0.446) (0.445) (0.446) (0.446) (0.446) 
     Philippines -2.288*** -2.320*** -2.317*** -2.323*** -2.327*** 
 (0.194) (0.195) (0.195) (0.196) (0.196) 
     Vietnam -0.705*** -0.734*** -0.729*** -0.739*** -0.734*** 
 (0.167) (0.167) (0.168) (0.168) (0.168) 
Reported Discrimination  0.124 0.015 0.368* -0.187 
  (0.248) (0.357) (0.224) (0.469) 
Combined Parent SEI -0.005** -0.008** -0.005** -0.005** -0.008** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Has Co-Ethnic Friends 0.477** 0.462** 0.271 0.460** 0.257 
 (0.192) (0.193) (0.278) (0.193) (0.279) 
Agreement with the U.S. Being the Best      
     Disagrees a little -0.036 -0.014 -0.019 -0.108 -0.106 
 (0.141) (0.141) (0.141) (0.228) (0.229) 
     Agrees a little -0.177 -0.156 -0.158 -0.043 -0.040 
 (0.139) (0.139) (0.139) (0.221) (0.222) 
     Agrees a lot -0.547*** -0.510*** -0.517*** -0.487** -0.477** 
 (0.139) (0.140) (0.140) (0.218) (0.219) 
Reported Discrimination*Combined Parent SEI  0.004   0.004 
  (0.004)   (0.004) 
Reported Discrimination*Has Co-Ethnic Friends   0.349  0.372 
   (0.373)  (0.374) 
Reported Discrimination*Disagrees a little    0.153 0.153 
    (0.289) (0.290) 
Reported Discrimination*Agrees a little    -0.191 -0.197 
    (0.280) (0.281) 
Reported Discrimination*Agrees a lot    -0.048 -0.063 
    (0.280) (0.281) 
Constant -3.742** -3.846** -3.853** -4.034** -3.658** 
 (1.574) (1.600) (1.587) (1.586) (1.613) 
 
Observations 3,227 3,227 3,227 3,227 3,227 
Note: Control variables are hidden from this table. See Table S5 for the table with visible control effects. 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Supplementary Table S1. Context of Reception by National Origins 
 Mexico Colombia Cuba Haiti Laos Nicaragua Philippines Vietnam N 
Prefer English 0.372 0.667 0.820 0.814 0.545 0.734 0.862 0.502 2,203 
Prefer HL 0.628 0.333 0.180 0.186 0.455 0.266 0.138 0.498 1,002 
No Co-Ethnic Friends 0.030 0.203 0.042 0.083 0.102 0.192 0.021 0.117 198 
Has Co-Ethnic Friends 0.970 0.797 0.958 0.917 0.898 0.808 0.979 0.883 2,662 
No Reported 
Discrimination 0.365 0.556 0.627 0.366 0.314 0.479 0.347 0.322 1,442 
Reported Discrimination 0.635 0.444 0.373 0.634 0.686 0.521 0.653 0.678 1,763 
Agreement with the 
American Way of Life 
Weakening Family Ties 
         
     Disagrees a lot 0.179 0.155 0.233 0.121 0.111 0.156 0.203 0.129 582 
     Disagrees a little 0.357 0.289 0.361 0.369 0.413 0.308 0.403 0.345 1,142 
     Agrees a little 0.366 0.303 0.287 0.404 0.354 0.318 0.317 0.379 1,035 
     Agrees a lot 0.098 0.254 0.120 0.106 0.122 0.218 0.076 0.147 394 
Agreement with the U.S. 
Being the Best          
     Disagrees a lot 0.174 0.262 0.115 0.387 0.109 0.253 0.110 0.112 493 
     Disagrees a little 0.306 0.312 0.178 0.268 0.240 0.246 0.245 0.202 749 
     Agrees a little 0.289 0.177 0.255 0.169 0.312 0.212 0.355 0.351 899 
     Agrees a lot 0.230 0.248 0.452 0.176 0.339 0.290 0.290 0.335 1,046 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD  
Combined Parent SEI 47.98 19.65 71.03 27.08 78.67 31.02 57.82 28.67 66.74 31.28 70.42 31.29 72.11 22.81 71.11 30.32  
